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THE NATION'S SECURITY 



How About Our Army and Navy? 



SPEECH 

OF 

HON. AUGUSTUS P. GARDNER 

OF MASSACHUSETTS 
IN THE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 



OCTOBER 16, 1914 



WASHINGTON 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
1014 
GCS5G -14263 






SPEECH 

OF 

HON. AUGUSTUS P. GARDNER. 



Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Speaker, yesterday I introduced House 
Joint resolution 372, "Providing for a national security com- 
mission." 

This resolution calls for an investigation whose purpose is 
to ascertain whether the United States is prepared for war. 
To-day I am addressing this body because I need help in press- 
ing that resolution to a hearing. 

A DELIBEKATE D3LUSI0N. 

For a dozen years I have sat here like a coward, and I 
Lave listened to men say that in time of war we could depend 
for our defense upon our National Guard and our Naval Militia, 
and I have known all of the time that it was not so. I am a 
former militiaman myself. I am a veteran of the Spanish 
War, and I tell you that any such doctrine is the supremest 
folly. Under that delusion in 10 short years we have allowed 
our Navy to slough away from a strong second to England, 
until now it is a very bad third and is fast sinking to fourth 
or fifth place. The theory in this country that we can create 
an army and a navy right off the reel is totally and entirely 
wrong. After war breaks out you can not improvise a dread- 
nought, you can not improvise a torpedo, you can not improvise 
a 42-centimeter howitzer, you can not improvise a travel- 
ing concrete plant, you can not improvise plants for inflating 
Zeppelin balloons, you can not improvise sailors. 

All those things must be provided in time of peace, and yet 
we are neglecting them. And, my friends, you can not make a 
fighting regiment out of a militia organization until you have 
either eliminated 20 per cent of the personnel of that militia 
organization or stiffened their resistance against the instinct of 
self-preservation. I have been a militiaman. I have seen 
militiamen go into the Spanish War. Many a lad enters the 
National Guard in times of peace and then is ashamed not to 
volunteer when war breaks out. He goes to war half-heartedly, 
hoping against hope that when the time comes he will be 
brave. Perhaps he may be brave, but often and often the 
spirit is willing and yet the flesh is weak. That 20 per cent 
I spoke of is quite enough to disorganize the best material 
which ever went to war. 

The militia has seldom been dependable in a tight place in 
the past. You have got to go through the long, weary process 
of cutting out the timid and hardening the rest before your 
National Guard regiment will become an effective Volunteer 
regiment. 

THE STORY OF THE SPANISH WAR. 

" Oh, yes," somebody says to me, " that is the same old story 
that we have been hearing so long, that the United States is 
2 66856—14263 

D. o* D. 
DEC .28 1916 






< 






not, prepared for war." My friends, it is the same old story, 
and it is a true old story. We were not prepared for war 
when the Spanish War broke out in 1S9S and we were not 
prepared for war when the Spanish War ended. 

At the end of April, 1898, war was declared against Spain, 
and there came a call for volunteers, for 125,000 only. After- 
wards, in May, came a call for 75,000 more volunteers. Did 
those volunteers mobilize, all equipped, rushing to the front 
like the coming of the wind? By no means. A great many 
of those volunteers have not mobilized yet. Did you know. 
Mr. Speaker, that in the Spanish War a great many States o£ 
this Union were unable to supply their entire quota until after 
the war was ended? If the gentleman from Pennsylvania, 
Gen. Hulings, were here to-day, he would tell you that on the 
0th day of August, 189S, at Coamo, P. R., three months and a 
half after war was declared, he led his men into action, armed 
with rifles which had only been in their hands for three days. 
In Cuba during the Spanish War, in the month of July, two 
regiments went into battle armed with short-range Springfield 
rifles, shooting black-powder cartridges. There in the press 
gallery sits Sergt. Goodwin, of Company K, Third Texas. 
Were he on the floor he could tell you how his company for 
five months had to put up with antique black-powder Spring- 
fields. To be sure, many of those valuable relics were at least 
safe, for they had no triggers and no plungers. 

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield? 

Mr GARDNER. Certainly, 

Mr. KAHN. I can assure the gentleman that the situation 
is not as bad as that to-day. We have SOO.000 rifles of the 
Springfield 1904 pattern, and that is the greatest reserve that 
this country has ever had at any one time. 

Mr. GARDNER. I was coming to our rifle reserve. On my 
right another Spanish War veteran, Mr. Greene of Vermont, 
reminds me that those two regiments in Cuba, of which I spoke, 
were armed with ramrod bayouets instead of intrenching tools. 

DEAF TO EVIDENCE. 

Let us see if the situation is much better to-day. The naval 
board is continually dinning into our ears a story of the un- 
preparedness of the United States for war. Every time ho 
issues a report, Gen. Wood tells us the same thins about the 
Army. He appeals to us to arise from our lethargv and take 
an interest in these questions which are vital to the Nation. 
Yet we go on slumbering and gibbering and scattering money 
for all sorts of projects wherever the votes grow thickest, and I 
am just as bad as anyone else in that respect. What is the 
matter with us? Are we blind? Are we crazy? Do we not 
see? Of course we see, but we know that every boy in the 
United States is brought up to believe that we can " lick " all 
creation, and we are ashamed, we are afraid, to go to our con- 
stituents and tell them the truth. I have been afraid all these 
dozen years to turn around and say to the National Guard in my 
district, " We can not depend on the greater part of the National 
Guard to do effective service in time of war." In all the dozen 
years that I have known that fact until this minute I have 
never said so. 

We Congressmen have been salving our consciences by trying 
to believe that no one would dare attack the United States. Are 9 

C0856— 142G3 



you so confident of that assumption now, gentlemen? Do you 
believe that if, after this war, Germany found the Monroe doc- 
trine standing in her way — Germany or any other powerful 
nation — do you feel so sure that she would pay any attention to 
that doctrine of ours if the redundancy of her population forced 
her to look about for colonial outlets? 

THE MONROE DOCTKINE AND ASIATIC EXCLUSION. 

The United States by the Monroe doctrine has said to the 
world, " You must not colonize in Mexico and you must not 
colonize in South America — rich, fertile South America. We do 
not intend to colonize there ourselves, but you shall not colonize 
there, either. You shall not be allowed to overflow America 
with colonies recruited from your teeming population." Do you 
believe that we can maintain any such doctrine unless we are 
prepared to fight for it? Then again, we have looked square in 
the eye of the most military nation which Asia has ever known, 
and we have said, " We will have none of you within our 
borders." Do you suppose a proud people like the Japanese will 
continue to listen with equanimity to a doctrine like that, unless 
behind that doctrine lies a force which can put it into effect? 
Perhaps men may say that the Monroe doctrine and the Asiatic 
exclusion doctrine are prompted by national selfishness. So be it. 
I concur in both doctrines. I am ready to battle for them and 
I am ready to pay the bill for enforcing them. 

Possibly the world may think that this country is a dog in 
the manger in its attitude toward South America and Mexico. 
At all events let us not be toothless dogs in the manger, who 
bark noisily, but when it comes to biting are found wanting. 

THE NAVY. 

I believe that our naval school at Annapolis leads the world. 
My race prejudice leads me to believe that perhaps English- 
speaking men make a little the best sailors in the world. There 
our advantages end. Let us try not to fool ourselves. Com- 
petent officers and brave men will not offset the difference be- 
tween a 0-inch gun and a 12-inch gun. 

How many men do you think we need in order to man the 
modest Navy which we have? We need from 75,000 to 100,000 
men. And how many do you think that we have? We have 
just about 50,000 men and some 9,000 Naval Militia. Before 
we can mobilize our entire fleet, if it is all worth mobilizing, 
which it is not, we must enlist approximately 41,000 raw re- 
cruits, many of whom never saw the sea in their whole lives. 

We have been reading about the exploits of the submarine 
which the Germans call U-9. We are told that she sank three 
British cruisers by three successive torpedoes. Perhaps you 
think we might do the same thing. We might if we had the 
torpedoes, but do you realize that we have on the average only 
one long-range torpedo, built or building, for each torpedo tube 
with which our vessels are supplied? 

Mr. BORLAND. Does the gentleman care to yield? 

Mr. GARDNER. Certainly. 

Mr. BORLAND. My understanding is, and I ask if it be 
correct, that the United States has spent more on its Navy 
in recent years per year than any nation except Great Britain; 
that we have exceeded annually the naval expenditure of Ger- 
many by twelve or fifteen million dollars. Is not that the fact? 

' <5fi856— 14263 



Mr. GARDNER. I do not know. What effect does that have 
on the argument? 

Mr. BORLAND. Under those conditions ought we not to 
have a better Navy? 

Mr. GARDNER. I can not tell the gentleman. I am talking 
about the results, not about the causes. I do not wish to go 
into controversial matters of that sort. I know the answer and 
so does the gentleman who interrupted me. Construction is ex- 
pensive in this country and our crews are highly paid. The 
German crews are unpaid, I think. 

Mr. Speaker, as I was saying, we have only one long-range 
torpedo for each torpedo tube. You might almost as well have 
one projectile for each gun, except that torpedoes cost $S,000 
each, and they are said to take nearly one year to build. 

The plans of modern warfare on the sea require fast scouts 
to keep in touch with the enemy and find out where he is. 
These scouts must have a minimum speed of 30 knots an 
hour. How many such scouts Co you suppose we have? Mr. 
Speaker, we have only three of these scouts with which 
to obtain our information. Germany has 14 fast scouts, t*nd 
Great Britain has 31. How about the great fighting weapon, 
the ship which must lie across the ocean paths and intercept 
the enemy? How about the dreadnought and the dreadnought 
cruiser, the great, strong fighting men-of-war? Let us see how 
we stand in that respect. Great Britain has 42 dreadnoughts 
and dreadnought cruisers built and building. Germany has 26. 
We have only 12, and three just authorized. " Oh," you say, 
"the day of dreadnoughts has gone by; it is submarines which 
we want." I do not agree with you that the dreadnought's day 
has passed, but most certainly I believe that we need a power- 
ful fleet of submarines. Let us see how we stand in that re- 
spect. Great Britain has 64 submarines, and we are fourth on 
the list. So it goes — we are short of nearly every kind of 
vessel and nearly every kind of armament. The longer it takes 
to build things, by some strange chance it seems as if the 
shorter we were of them. 

Now, if we have not got a fleet, ship for ship, which matches 
the fleet which comes against us we probably can not stop that 
opposing fleet. If we can not stop his fleet, the enemy can land 
his troops anywhere on the coast of the United States that he 
sees fit. We have no Army wherewith to oppose them. 

THE ARMY. 

Do you know what we have got in the way of an Army? Do 
you know what we have got with which to oppose 4,000,000 
trained men, which happens to be the war strength of the Ger- 
man Army? Do you realize that we have only about 85.000 
regulars and about 120,000 militia? Are those militia trained? 
Why, Mr. Speaker, 60 per cent of the men in the militia who 
are armed with a rifle do not know how to use it properly. 
Sixty per cent last year were unable to qualify even as third- 
class marksmen. 

Half of that 60 per cent — 30 per cent — did not even try to 
qualify with the rifle. That is all which we have got to de- 
fend us. What is the use of talking this arrant humbug any 
more to the country? I am telling you the trutn. That is 
what we have got to face. But I do not blame you gentlemen. 
66856—14263 



6 

I blame the inflated optimism which has led us to believe that 
we can whip all creation. 

Mr. Speaker, as the gentleman from California [Mr. Kahn] 
said, it is a fact that at last we have nearly one million modern 
rifles on which we can depend. How about our artillery? Let 
us see what Gen. Wood, the Chief of Staff, said in his report 
last year. He tells us of the " alarming condition of shortage " 
in our field artillery guns and ammunition. 

Present-day events are showing that it is mighty dangerous 
to be weak in artillery. 

Of course, it is evident that our main defense must be the 
Navy. This country will not tolerate these huge European land 
armaments. But at all events we can vastly increase the Regu- 
lar Army without putting an undue burden on the taxpayers. 
Furthermore, we can equip it with plenty of the latest artillery ; 
we can equip it with plenty of the latest machines for fighting 
in the air; we can double the number of our officers; we can 
treble the number of our noncommissioned officers; and, by the 
way, all England to-day is posted with advertisements offering 
inducements for old noncommissioned officers to rejoin -the 
colors. 

Mr. HUMPHREYS of Mississippi. Will the gentleman yield 
for a question? 

Mr. GARDNER. Yes. 

Mr. HUMPHREYS of Mississippi. How long does it require 
to manufacture the ordinary field artillery? 

Mr. GARDNER. The 3s? 

Mr. HUMPHREYS of Mississippi. I do not know how many 
" 3s " there are. 

Mr. GARDNER. No one knows how long it takes to manu- 
facture the 42-centimetor guns, because they are quite new in 
war. I understand 4 bat it takes a year to manufacture cer- 
tain kinds of cannon, but I believe that it can be done more 
expeditiously in the Krupp factory than in the United States. 

Mr. HUMPHREYS of Mississippi. I am speaking of the 
character of held artillery that we have now. 

Mr. GARDNER. A member of the Committee on Military 
Affairs on my right tells me that it takes nine months to make 
the ordinary' field artillery; that is. the horse artillery. 

Mr. HUMPHREYS of Mississippi. The gentleman will par- 
don me. The answer usually made is that it takes a long time 
to build a navy, but that we could very readily put an army 
in the field, because we could get the men. 

Mr. GARDNER. If tile gentleman has followed my argument 
lie knows that I believe that we can not get the men in a short 
space of time. 

Mr. HUMPHREYS of Mississippi. I believe so, too. I be- 
lieve as the gentleman does. It would be utterly impossible 
for us to equip the Army with artillery under 12 months; it 
matters not how much money we were willing to spend. 

Mr. GARDNER. If you want to build this enormous German 
artillery, which is drawn by two motors and pushed by a third, 
no one knows how long it will take to do so. 

Mr. MONTAGUE. I did not understand the gentleman's 
statement just now. Was it that we could not get the men, or 
what was it? 

COXoC— 1420:} 



Mr. GARDNER. In my opinion it would take a long time to 
get the men. I have stated my own belief that militia must not 
be depended upon for our defense. 

Mr. MONTAGUE. May I ask the gentleman what is the 
need, then, of exposing our weakness to the world at this par- 
ticular time? 

Mr. GARDNER. That is what gentlemen have been saying 
right along. Meanwhile we have gone ahead telling our boys 
that we can whip the world without half trying. The gentleman 
says that we must not tell the world of our weakness. The 
fact is that foreigners already perceive our weakness a great 
deal more clearly than the American people do. 

Mr. KAHN. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. GARDNER. Yes. 

Mr. HUMPHREYS of Mississippi. The fact is that the Ameri- 
can people are the only people who do not know it. Is not that 
a fact? 

Mr. KAHN. The gentleman has referred to the report of 
Gen. Leonard Wood of last year in reference to our inefficiency 
in the artillery branch of our establishment. Does not the 
gentleman know we appropriated some millions of dollars for 
the increase of the artillery in the last military appropriation 
bill? 

CONCLUSION. 

Mr. GARDNER. I know there has been an improvement in 
artillery, but what I am contending for is a radical change, not 
a palliative. The whole matter lies deeper than Congress. The 
trouble is that we have never dared to tell the people that they 
are living in a fool's paradise, for fear that we should antagonize 
somebody aud perhaps incur the charge that we are revealing 
our weakness to foreign nations, as if there were any secret 
about our weakness which we could conceal if we tried. The 
truth is that each one of us is afraid that some National- 
Guard man in his district will say, " Why, that man Gardner 
st.ys I am no good. I will teach him." That is why the people 
of the United States have not yet awakened to the under- 
standing that 42-centimeter guns and superdreadnoughts present 
stronger arguments than past victories and present treaties. 



APPENDIX. 
Statement given to the press October 15, 1914, by Congress- 
man Gardner, of Massachusetts, upon the introduction of 
House joint resolution 372, " Providing for a national security 
commission : " 

TOTALLY UNPREPARED FOR WAR. 

I have introduced this resolution to investigate the military status 
of the United States, because I know that a public searchlight will 
open the eyes of Americans to a situ..tion which is being con- 
cealed from them. 

The United States is totally unprepared for a war, defensive or 
offensive, against a real power. In my opinion, the effect of the vast 
sums of money spent by Mr. Carnegie in his peace propaganda has 
been to blind Americans to the fact that our national security from 
a military point of view is undermined. 

Nearly every Army and Navy officer to whom I have spoken tells 
me the same story of inadequate security. I have yet to speak to a 
single member of either the Committee on Naval Affairs or the Com- 
mittee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives, in whose 
66856— 142G3 



8 

Judgment I have confidence, who does not, in private, make exactly 
the same admission. Yet all these gentlemen seem to consider it their 
duly to refrain from making any public statement. 

TIIE MONROE DOCTRINE. 

VT.2 are the most prosperous nation on earth, and to the south of 
ns lies the wonderful South American continent, which we have 
closed to European colonization hy the Monroe Doctrine. I simplv 
can not understand how any intelligent student of history can fail 
to see that we are impotent to defend ourselves and to enforce the 
Monroe Doctrine by moral suasion and financial might alone. 

THE GERMAN MENACE TO DEMOCRACY. 

The time has not yet come when the United btatcs can afford to 
allow the martial spirit of her sons to be destroyed, and all the Car- 
negie millions in the world will not silence those of us who believe that 
bullets can not be stopped with bombast nor powder vanquished by 
platitudes. 

It is true that with respect to the present European war my views 
are not those of a neutral. I am entirely convinced that the German 
cause is unholy and, moreover, a menace to the principles of democracy. 
Furthermore, I believe that the god of battles will visit defeat upon the 
Germans. 

OCR SECURITY DEMANDS IMMEDIATE ACTION. 

But no matter which side wins wc must remember that since the be- 
ginning of time victorious nations have proved headstrong and high- 
handed. We must begin at once to reorganize our military strength 
if we expect to be able to resist high-handedness when the day of 
necessity comes. 

Of course, all this is unpopular, doctrine. It would be far easier for 
me to declare that all is well and that our present military establish- 
ment, coupled with our national guard and our naval militia, is to be 
depended upon for our defense. Unfortunately I can not bring myself 
to believe any such thing. 



Mr. Gardner introduced the following joint resolution, which 
was referred to the Committee ou Rules and ordered to be 
printed : 

Joint resolution (II. J. Res. 372) providing for a national security com- 
mission. 

llesolocd by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled. That a commission is hereby 
created, to be called the national security commission, consisting of 
three Senators, to be appointed by the President of the Senate, and 
three Members of the House of Representatives, to be appointed by the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and three persons to be ap- 
pointed by the President of the United States. Said commission shall 
make full investigation, by subcommittee or otherwise, into the question 
of the preparedness of the United States for war, defensive or offensive. 
Said commission shall report to the Congress its findings and shall 
make such recommendations as in its judgment may seem proper. 

For the purpose of said investigation said commission is authorized 
to send for persons and papers, to make all necessary travel, either in 
the United States or any foreign country, and to administer oaths. 
Such sums of money as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of 
'ftiis resolution are hereby appropriated out of any money in the Treas- 
ury not otherwise appropriated: Provided, That not more than one Sen- 
ator and one Member of ihe House of Representatives appointed on said 
commission shall be a member either of the Committee on Military 
Affairs or of the Committee on Naval Affairs of their respective bodies. 
GGS5G— 14263 



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